

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

# Central Intelligence Bulletin

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# Central Intelligence Bulletin

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
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
South Vietnam: Military activity remains at a moderate level, comparable to the weeks before the current offensive.


The Communists on 14 March launched another ground attack just south of the Demilitarized Zone, however, killing ten US Marines and wounding 40 at a cost of 23 enemy dead. In a new attack on Hue, the Communists fired four 122-mm. rockets into the city; initial reports indicate this attack caused only light damage and no casualties. Elsewhere in the country, allied military units and installations continued to be the main targets of limited enemy mortar and rocket attacks and small ground probes.

In northeastern Tay Ninh Province, US pilots reported two enemy armored vehicles near an allied Special Forces camp; one was identified as a Soviet-built PT-76 amphibious tank. Although there have previously been some unconfirmed reports of enemy tanks in III Corps, this is the first such firm sighting of enemy armor in this region.

| Up to te      | n PT-76s  | were | engaged  | against  | the  | Ben  |
|---------------|-----------|------|----------|----------|------|------|
| Het Special F | orces cam | p in | western_ | Kontum I | rovi | .nce |
| on 3 March.   |           |      | (Map)    |          |      |      |


## New Soviet V-12 Helicopter





Fuselage length - 125 ft.
Rotor radius - 57 ft.

Wing span - 108 ft.



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USSR: The giant new V-12 helicopter made a record load-lifting flight from a Moscow airport on 22 February.

According to Soviet press coverage of the flight, the V-12 lifted 68,266 pounds of cargo to an altitude of 9,675 feet. This load exceeds the existing world record held by another Soviet helicopter, the MI-10, by some 13,000 pounds. It is also about three times greater than can be carried by the CH-54, the largest US helicopter.

This is the first time that the Soviets have publicized the V-12, which almost certainly is the helicopter photographed last July

A Soviet attaché in Paris reported last October that the new helicopter probably would be shown at the Paris international air show this spring.


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
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
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### USSR: New Agricultural Goals for 1980\*







\*Although CIA estimates of absolute output are less than official claims, the above percentage rates of change are valid.

USSR: A recent agricultural conference has announced new long-term agricultural goals that are considerably reduced from the original targets for 1980 set by Khrushchev in 1961.

The revised targets for 1980 are still ambitious, however, in the light of the recent performance of Soviet agriculture. To meet the new 1980 goal for gross agricultural output, the average annual rate of increase during 1969-80 must match the rate of about 4.5 percent achieved during 1966-68.

On the basis of past rates of growth, the new grain target might appear reasonable. Soviet officials have indicated, however, that they do not intend to expand significantly the area sown to grain crops. Most if not all of the increase in output, therefore, must be obtained from a rise in yields, and for most grains these will have to be raised to present US levels if the over-all target is to be met. The implied annual rate of increase in grain yields of about 3.5 percent is well in excess of the average annual rate of about 2 percent achieved during the past 13 years.

If grain production is actually raised to the planned level, the increased availability of feed for livestock would ensure realization of the 1980 meat target. Even if this target were met, however, per capita consumption of meat in the USSR would still remain 10 to 15 percent below the current levels in most West European countries and nearly 50 percent below the level in the US. (Chart)

Warsaw Pact: Top Soviet and East European political and military leaders will gather in Budapest on 17 March for a two-day meeting of the Warsaw Pact political consultative committee, the Pact's highest-level policy making body.

Soviet party chief Brezhnev headed a highlevel delegation which left Moscow yesterday for the meeting. In addition to Brezhnev, Premier Kosygin, the foreign and defense ministers, and Pact commander Yakubovsky will attend the meeting.

The Rumanians, who will attend, believe that nothing much will be accomplished at the meeting; some say that there might be squabbling over "procedural points." Two controversial issues may be discussed--Pact maneuvers and the transit of Pact forces through member countries.

The recent Sino-Soviet border clash is also likely to be reviewed, and the Soviets probably will be seeking a declaration of support.

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Ethiopia: The government has expelled three Soviet and three Czechoslovak officials for alleged involvement with dissident students.

The government has regularly alleged foreign interference after previous student demonstrations. Although it has not spelled out its case against the accused officials,

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In any case, the expulsion is the government's latest move in its war of nerves with restive students. The incident provides the authorities with a convenient justification for their recent actions against student demonstrators and an excuse to ignore deep-seated grievances of the students and other discontented groups of the educated elite.

The government may also use the incident as a reason for expelling radical students. The authorities are already trying to shake general student support for the radicals by emphasizing their dealings with Communist agents.

Since failing to bring off their planned demonstrations earlier this month, the students have boycotted classes. They have been distributing propaganda leaflets and provoking minor acts of violence. The university is now considering a possible deadline before which students must return to classes or lose a semester's credit, a move that may return the campus to normal, although it could merely spark new disorders.

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Yemen: The government may soon attempt to form a new coalition which would include tribal leaders formerly supporting the royalists.

Sana has scheduled a conference of national leaders for the middle of March, although there may be some delay. This National Assembly will be composed essentially of tribal leaders, army officers, and religious leaders. Its mission will be the election of a new Republican Council president—chief of state—and a new cabinet. During the year it will be in session the assembly is also slated to set up the apparatus for a new legislative body.

This conference has been scheduled for some time, and the increasing number of tribal defections from the royalists has increased its chances of success. President Iryani and Premier al-Amri, who are identified with the old republican regime, have indicated that they would like to relinquish their posts, and press reports from Aden state that they may resign soon-possibly this weekend-prior to the convening of the National Assembly. The convening of this assembly will mark a further step in the gradual blurring of the basic differences between the republicans and royalists that led to the civil war.

Burma: General Ne Win may be considering proposals on the political reforms he mentioned last fall.

In November he called together a civilian advisory body of former political figures and charged it with formulating proposals for national unity and a new constitution. Jockeying among the long-time political rivals resulted in the submission in early February of three separate suggestions for "civilianization," including an interim parliament.

Reports of recent meetings between the general and his military associates suggest that he is giving active consideration to the proposals. Ne Win is said to plan to assume the office of a strong president and to create a civilian premiership and a cabinet with participation by ethnic minorities. Ex-premier U Ba Swe, who is considered more acceptable to the army than any other politician, apparently is front runner for the proposed premiership.

Factions within the ruling military revolutionary council are reported to have objected heatedly to any sharing of power with civilians. Ne Win, however, clearly intends to retain preeminence in any structural change, and probably has the ability to impose his decision on the military.

### NOTES

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Czechoslovakia-Iran: A sharp expansion in Czechoslovak-Iranian economic relations is envisaged under several agreements concluded between the two states on 12 March. An economic aid pact has formalized an aide memoire of May 1968, which called for Prague to extend \$200 million in credits for the purchase of plant equipment and machinery, to be repaid with Iranian crude oil. This agreement, together with a long-term trade agreement signed simultaneously, is expected to boost annual trade between Czechoslovakia and Iran from \$36 million to \$53 million during the next five years. Prague also indicated its readiness to supply nuclear energy generating plants and to cooperate in dam construction in Iran.

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